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From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the Mitchell
decision has strong support. The action of police officers in setting up
a motor vehicle road block for the sole purpose of inspecting oper-
ators' licenses is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state,
and such procedure is therefore constitutional. The Mitchell case rep-
resents a strong argument in favor of the basic proposition that an in-
dividual can be coerced into a partial surrender of his individual
rights in order to protect the interests of the general public. In up-
holding this proposition, the court in the Mitchell case said:
"if stopping motorists indiscriminately by police officers for the
good faith purpose of inspecting or asking for the exhibition of
a driver's license were not permitted, the licensing law would
break down and become a nullity, and the objective of promot-
ing safety from irresponsible automobile drivers would be ser-
iously impeded. There could be but few occasions where an
officer could otherwise learn that the law was being violated."3 6
WELDON J. SMriH
ENHANCEMENT OF VALUE AS ELEMENT
OF ARTISAN'S LIEN
The right of a person to possession of that which he owns runs
deep in our legal system. However, this general rule has exceptions,
where the rights of another may prevail over -the rights of the owner.
For example, an owner of personal property cannot reclaim his chat-
tel from one whom he has requested to perform some service thereon,
until this owner pays for the service rendered. The chattel is sub-
jected to a common law possessory lien, commonly referred to as an
artisan's lien.' "He who by labor, skill or materials adds value to the
chattel of another whether under an express or implied agreement has
a possessory lien thereon for the value of his services and may retain
the chattel in his possession until the same be paid."2
The recent New Jersey case of Beck v. Nutrodynamics, Inc.,3 pro-
vides an excellent example of the application of the artisan's lien by
courts today. Nutrodynamics, Inc., a drug manufacturer, delivered
drugs in loose pill form to the Ivers-Lee Co. for the purpose of having
'4355 SAV.',d at 688.
1Brown, Personal Property § 107, at 5o8 (.d ed. 1955).
21d. at 511.
377 NJ. Super. 448, 186 A.2d 715 (Essex County Ct. 1962).
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them wrapped in foil, packaged and prepared in containers for ship-
ment. The New Jersey Superior Court held that the labor performed
by Ivers-Lee enhanced the value of the pills and awarded Ivers-Lee
a possessory lien on the pills. Since there is no statutory artisan's lien
in New Jersey, the court utilized the common law in determining the
propriety of awarding an artisan's lien.
This raises the question as to what the courts have interpreted as
"value." The early decisions seemed to adhere to the principle that
adding value means increasing the market value of a chattel. Thus
the work performed by Ivers-Lee clearly falls into the early concept of
a laborer entitled to an artisan's lien. The old common law courts had
no difficulty in awarding artisans' liens to those persons who did such
things as repair buggies,4 wagons5 and farm equipment.6 Such liens
were based on the increase in market value of the repaired chattel.
Although these early decisions were made in an agricultural society,
the concept involved has been readily adapted to the more complex
industrial society of today. It is obvious that the mechanic who re-
pairs an automobile7 has increased its market value as did the black-
smith who repaired a buggy. Similarly, the present day processor who
fills cans with tomatoes s increases the marketability of those cans
just as the cotton ginner increased the value of cotton9 by his work.
The company that in this age processes, oils and packages electronic
parts10 increases the marketability of that product as did the artisan
of yesteryear who cleaned and oiled a harness.".
There are certain types of cases in which the work performed on
the chattel clearly increases its market value and the courts have been
consistent in awarding liens for this enhancement. These cases may
be put into three classifications:
(i) processing agricultural and animal products;' 2
'Drummond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 54 Neb. 417, 74 N.W. 966 (1898).
rGardner v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ark. 464, 184 S.W. 51 (1916); White v. Smith
44 N.J.L. 105 (C.P. 1882); Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628 (N.Y. 1846).
OCrump & Rodgers Co. v. Southern Implement Co., 229 Ark. 285, 316 S.W.d
121 (1958) (cotton picker).
"Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Pfaffman, 177 Cal. log, 169 Pac. io3 (1917); Meyers v.
Neeley & Ensor Auto Co., 143 Md. 107, 121 Atd. 916 (1923).
"Bennett v. Brittingham, 33 Del. 519, 14o At. 154 (Super. Ct. 1927).
OQuiver Gin Co. v. Looney, 144 Miss. 709, Mi So. 107 (1927).
"°In the Matter of Tele King Corp., 137 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
3'Wilson v. Martin, 40 N.H. 88 (186o).
22In re Lindan, 183 Fed. 608 (191o) (working skins into garments); Kirkman
Corp. v. Owens, 62 Cal. App. 2d 193, 144 P.2d 405 (1944) (care of seedling fruit
trees); Holderman v. Mainer, io4 Ind. 118, 3 N.E. 811 (1885) (sawing timber into
lumber); Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21 (1855) (rendering and barreling lard); Nevan
v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207 (1859) (threshing oats); Henwood & Nowak, Inc. v. Dietz,
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(2) processing industrial products; 13
(3) repairing chattels.
14
Under the common law, certain parties were denied an artisan's lien
even though they had performed services on a chattel of another be-
cause the courts could find no increase in market value of that chattel.
Among those overlooked were liverymen'5 and agisters,' 6 the courts
having felt that stabling a horse or pasturing a cow did not increase
the chattel's market value. More recent decisions have applied the
same policy to garagemen who store vehicles,17 feeling that the vehicle
does not appreciate in value through the garageman's efforts.
The courts also follow the market value interpretation in denying
an artisan's lien to private carriers on the theory that no increase in
value occurs by the mere act of moving the chattel,' 8 although at
least one court has held that moving a chattel closer to its market
does in fact increase its market value.' 9 While common carriers are
allowed common law possessory liens, the courts have awarded the
246 Mass. g, '39 N.E. 843 (1923) (tanning skins); Lee v. Seals, 215 Mo. App.
582, 256 S.W. 830 1(923) (threshing wheat); Sheinman &. Salita, Inc. v. Paraskevas, 194
N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (finishing and dressing beaver skins); Mathias v.
Sellers, 86 Pa. 486 (1878) (making cigars from tobacco); Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt.
468 (1861) (making starch from potatoes); Avians v. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N.W.
188 (1885) (sawing timber into lumber and shingles).
'Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(printing and binding books); Blumenberg Press v. Mutual Mercantile Agency,
177 N.Y. 362, 69 N.E. 641 (19o4) (printing a reference book); Wiles Laundry Co.
v. Hahlo, 105 N.Y. 234, 11 N.E. 500 (1887) (processing collars and cuffs); Jeanette
Doll Co. v. Cusmano, 12o Misc. 782, 199 N.Y.S. 751 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (manu-
facturing Kewpie dolls); Kutcher v. Oriental Silk Printing Co., 113 Misc. 331,
184 N.Y.S. 595 (Sup. Ct. 192o) (dyeing and printing silk); International Electronics
Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Products Co., 370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 (1952) (assembling magnetic
tape recorder-reproducer units); Kap-Tex, Inc. v. Romans, 136 W. Va. 489, 67
S.E.2d 847 (ig5i) (manufacturing apparel).
"Gardner v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ark. 464, 184 S.W. 51 (1916) (repairing wagon
and shoeing horses); Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Pfaffmann, 177 Cal. l09, 169 Pac 1033
(1917) (repairing automobiles); Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Flagler, 310 Ill. App.
2,11, 33 N.E.2d 751 (1941) (repairing and installing tanks on trucks); Lord v. Jones,
2 Me. 439 (1844) (curing lame horse); Drummond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 54 Neb.
417, 74 N.W. 966 (1898) (repairing buggy); White v. Smith, 44 N.J.L. io5 (C.P.
1882) (repairing wagon).
n Brown, Personal Property § io8 at 514 (2d ed. 1955).
1Id. at 520; see 37 Mich L. Rev. 273 (1938) and 26 Mo. L. Rev. io5 (1961).
'-O'Brien v. Isaacs, 17 Wis. 2d 261, 116 N.W.2d 246 (1962); West Allis Industrial
Loan Co. v. Stark, 197 Wis. 363, 222 N.W. 31o (1928).
25Brown, Personal Property § 113 at 544 (2d ed. 1955).
"Farrington v. Meek, 3o Mo. 578, 582 (186o) (allowed lien to raftsmen for
transporting lumber closer to its market). The court said that "the principal basis
of specific liens may be now regarded as resting upon the principle that the value
of the property has been enhanced, by the labor of the bailee."
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lien on the basis of the carriers' liability as insurers of the goods they
carry rather than on an enhancement theory.2
0
There are numerous cases where artisans claimed liens on tools
used to perform work on a chattel, where the tools as well as the
chattel were supplied by the owner.21 Here again the courts deny the
liens sought on the grounds that since no work is directed toward
the implements as such, there can be no increase in their market value.
Gradually, the courts are beginning to realize that an increase in
market value as the sole criteria for granting an artisan's lien is not
broad enough because it fails to protect artisans who have performed
labors when those labors have not increased the market value of the
chattel. The court, in the case of Chicago Great W.R.R. Co. v. Ameri-
can McKenna Process Co., 22 in holding that enchancement does not
necessarily mean an increase in market value, stated:
" [V]alue' does not always mean market value. If an owner
of property employs a mechanic to change its character to satis-
fy some special use or even whim of the owner, the mechanic
is not deprived of his right of lien because the article may have
less market value after it is finished than it had before."23
Consequently, the court awarded a lien for inspecting and handling
rails, functions which do not increase the market value of said rails.
A unique litigation involving an artisan's lien is the New York
case of In re Harriss' Estate.24 Deceased, while still alive, hired an
artisan "to dismantle and preserve the architectural interior of a cer-
tain room known as 'the Shrine of Romeo and Juliet' located in the
residence of the deceased." The artisan, as directed, dismantled, crated
and removed the parts to his warehouse and was awarded a lien for
services performed. Certainly an argument can be made that these
objects of art are not as valuable in a dismantled and crated state as
they are on display.
Most statutes regarding artisan's liens recognize, in accordance
with the common law, that an increase in market value constitutes
enhancement. However, most of these statutes have broadened the
'*Brown, Personal Property § 113 (2d ed. 1955). See also, Note, 18 Ky. L.J.
170 (1930).
"Independent Film Distribs. Ltd. v. Chesapeake Indus. Inc., 250 F.2d 951
(2d Cir. 1958) (negative film used to produce pictures); American Pine Apple
Products Co. v. Chicago Job Press Co., 216 Ill. App. 362 (1920) (plates used to
print can labels); Even-Heat Co. v. Wade Elec. Prods. Co., 336 Mich. 564, 5
N.W.2d 923 (1953) (dyes used in production of parts).
--2oo Ill. App. 166 (1916).
2Id. at 172.
=174 Misc. 34, 18 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Surf. Ct. 1940).
